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This paper explores how events surrounding the Thirty Year’s War affected the 
political hierarchy within the Holy Roman Empire and her various states, as well 
as thoughts on collective security, state-sovereignty, and international relations 
across Europe.  This essay will examine the Treaty of Westphalia, and the social 
and political effects that this extraordinary piece of international legislation had 
on major European powers.  This essay will also analyze the influence the treaty 
would have over future disputes and conflicts arising in post-Westphalian Europe 
leading into the 21st Century.    
 
 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia was a monumental piece of international legislation.  
Europe had never seen a piece of legislation that affected so many countries on such 
a large social, political, and economic scale. Although the treaty’s primary intention 
was to end the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire, it changed how many 
international leaders, both current and future, would view international relations 
and their own countries’ power hierarchies. It phased out old political and social 
institutions that had previously held great power, drastically reducing the powers 
of political and religious leaders, such as the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope. 
The Peace of Westphalia, and its aftermath, laid the groundwork for what would 
evolve into the modern ideas of sovereignty we see today in its promotion of the 
ideas about the independence of nation-states and the collective European security 
that still survives today.  
 
The independence and autonomy of nation-states was a central idea in the Treaty 
of Westphalia and others treaties, such as the Treaty of Pyrenees in 1659.1  Since 
the Treaty of Westphalia was decided and written by diplomats from around a 
thousand of mostly autonomous nation-states and various countries across Europe, 
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it took a unique, sovereignty-asserting view that had seldom been seen before.2 
Before the Treaty of Westphalia, peace treaties had been administered between 
rulers of nations, but in Westphalia’s case this was not just a treaty between the 
Holy Roman Empire and a European nation; it was a treaty to bring peace within 
the Holy Roman Empire and subsequently settle the Empire’s disputes with the rest 
of Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia allowed the Holy Roman Empire’s nation-
states to effectively operate as independent entities and paved the way for states, 
such as Austria, to pursue complete independence as its own powerful nation.3  This 
autonomy was not just gained because the nation-states suddenly decided they 
wanted independence from the Holy Roman Emperor’s control and interference; 
instead, this was achieved because the Holy Roman Empire’s states had the backing 
of other independent nations. The Treaty of Westphalia was a peace treaty first and 
foremost for the Empire and countries such as Sweden, and France recognized that 
if a lasting peace was the ultimate aim it must first be achieved by the Holy Roman 
Empire’s nation-states. In 1644, Count d’Avaux confirmed this sentiment when he 
proclaimed: 
 
It would seem that…the honour and profit of France will best be served 
by placing first on the table the items concerning the public peace and the 
liberties of the Empire…because if they [the German states] do not yet 
truly wish for peace, it would be prejudicial and damaging to us if the talks 
broke down over our own particular demands.4 
 
The French count acknowledged the need to have input, not just from the Holy 
Roman Emperor, but also from a delegation of the nation-states. After the creation 
of the delegation, its members successfully made several demands which were then 
granted and imposed on the appropriate European nations; usually by the signing 
of a later treaty or legislation. In 1648, the concept of international and multilateral 
agreements was relatively new, but would serve as a proponent of the kind of 
international diplomacy the world sees today.  
 
Sections I and II of the Treaty of Westphalia showed the Empire and Europe’s 
desire for peace and amnesty. Domestically, this meant the Holy Roman Empire 
and its nation-states could continue to debate and demand without the fear of war.5  
Now that peace had been achieved, many nation-states rushed to put forward their 
own demands which, in many cases, included the right to be independent, sovereign 
nations. From a religious point of view, many of the nation-states were also 
enforcing tolerance towards Protestants, giving them equal rights as Catholic 
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citizens. They understood that legislation that tolerated Protestants would garner 
strong oppositions from the Pope, so the delegates included a clause that claimed 
⸺ despite the Church’s objections ⸺ that the Treaty was valid.6  This measure is 
one of the first steps towards unity seen where several nation-states came together 
to limit the Pope’s power and supreme authority.7  The next step that the German 
princes and lords within the Empire took was to limit the power of the weak and 
ineffective Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III. With France and 
Sweden’s support, the German princes were able to gain considerable control and 
influence over the Holy Roman Empire’s internal affairs and their own states within 
that Empire. Decisions concerning war and trade all had to be approved by the 
council of princes and electors, effectively making the Holy Roman Emperor’s title 
purely symbolic.8  Now, throughout German nation-states, real power is 
concentrated in Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg and Austria.  Even though the Holy 
Roman Emperor’s title was seemingly irrelevant in making domestic decisions, his 
position as the Emperor of Austria still made him a powerful European leader 
internationally.9  The political power that many of the newly independent nation-
states gained not only shaped the Holy Roman Empire until its dissolution in 1806, 
but also Europe for centuries. 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia’s effect on the Holy Roman Empire’s political landscape 
was felt across Europe as many autonomous nation-states sought to gain greater 
power and influence. With the Treaty, states gained the right to regulate their 
internal affairs without the influence or interference of other nations.10  This meant 
that the nation-states of Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and others were now free to trade 
with other nations, such as France and Britain, and also to keep a standing army to 
ensure the lasting defense of their state.11, 12  Nation-states continued to exercise 
their new found powers and grew exponentially over the following centuries as 
they, and other European nations, made alliances. The Austrian Habsburgs’ alliance 
with the Spanish Habsburgs is just one of the many examples where two separate 
nations (or nation-states) could mutually agree to support one another in order to 
quell the growing power of another nation, such as France.13  Since Ferdinand III 
could not support the Spanish via the Holy Roman Empire, he chose to do this 
through his own power in Austria. After this event, Austria was now seen as a 
growing power on the European stage, and it showed how multiple nations could 
work together to ensure the collective security of their peoples. Throughout the 
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following centuries, this alliance strategy would be seen numerous times, especially 
in international wars, such as World War I and World War II where, in effect, the 
entire globe came together to limit Germany’s power.14  In peacetime, this idea of 
collective security was the basis for modern ideas of collective security 
organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), in the 20th and 21st centuries. Organizations, like the EU, 
help ensure that one nation does not become too large and powerful.15  This 
approach was first seen at Westphalia in 1648, and has been a significant and vital 
tool in creating stable and long-lasting peace agreements around the world.  
 
While the Treaty of Westphalia was primarily conceived as a way to end the Thirty 
Years’ War and ensure a “Christian and Universal Peace,”16 it was more than just 
that. Whether intentional or unintentional, there is no doubt that the Treaty of 
Westphalia and other subsequent agreements, such as the Habsburgs’ alliance, 
helped to bolster the German nation-states and shifted Europe to a more 
sovereignty-based political ideology which evolved into what we see today; a 
system where nations are equal and accepted. The Treaty of Westphalia also served 
as a basis for the collective security of European nations and put forward ideas to 
ensure that no one nation can becomes too powerful and dangerous; ideas that are 
still practiced today across Europe and around the world. 
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